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Nomenclature 
CVE  = Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures  
DEE  = Development External Enclave 
KSC  = Kennedy Space Center 
NASA   = National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NIST  = National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NVD  = National Vulnerability Database 
NGVM  = Next Generation Vulnerability Management 
OEE  = Operational External Enclave 
SCCS   = Spaceport Command and Control System 
 
I. Introduction 
With the rapid development of the Internet, the number of malicious threats to organizations is continually 
increasing. In June of 2015, the United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) had a data breach resulting in 
the compromise of millions of government employee records. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) is not exempt from these attacks. Cyber security is becoming a critical facet to the discussion of moving 
forward with projects. The Spaceport Command and Control System (SCCS) project at the Kennedy Space Center 
(KSC) aims to develop the launch control system for the next generation launch vehicle in the coming decades. There 
are many ways to increase the security of the network it uses, from vulnerability management to ensuring operating 
system images are compliant with securely configured baselines recommended by the United States Government. 
II. Objectives 
The IT Security division is responsible for monitoring security protocols, vulnerabilities, malicious code, system 
configurations, and system events to correct known vulnerabilities and provide cost-effective IT security 
implementation and continuous monitoring. The confidentiality, integrity and availability of resources for the SCCS 
project are a crucial aspect especially because the project is starting to accelerate in development. As the project 
approaches operational status, the resources needed for the operational phase also need to be deployed to meet the 
needs of the project.  
"Vulnerability" is a broad term in the information assurance industry. It can be better defined by limiting the 
scope to instances of susceptible software or applications that an attacker may attempt to utilize to gain access to 
resources. Configuration management is another aspect of managing and limiting vulnerabilities. Having updated 
software is a good attempt at securing your system, but without having the proper and secure settings configured and 
enabled, a system is still vulnerable. 
Vulnerabilities are found on a regular basis and compiled in the National Vulnerability Database, managed by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). NIST has also produced Special Publication 500-83, which 
identifies Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. This document outlines 
the recommended settings as well as configurations to ensure that government information systems are secure.  
In order to effectively support the Cyber Security and IT Security teams, becoming familiarized with the project’s 
assets was key to understanding how hardware was connected. There are various networks within the Launch Control 
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Center (LCC). The Operational External Enclave (OEE) and the Development External Enclave (DEE) provide 
resources for the operational and development software developers respectively. These networks contain various 
components and network assets such as master consoles, remote displays, and their supporting equipment.  
III. Cyber Security Internship - Spaceport Command and Control System 
A. Vulnerabilities Targeting Development Sets with Remote Access to Operational Sets 
The first aspect of my project was to take a closer look at vulnerabilities within the LCC, specifically with 
development computers that have remote access with permissions to access the operational firing rooms. While this 
may not be as critical of an issue because the project is not near the operational phase, it is important to understand 
the current status of vulnerabilities and the potential effects in the case of a data breach. 
To accomplish this, next generation vulnerability management software was utilized. This software scans a given 
list of computers to identify possible vulnerabilities as well as to recommend what courses of action were available to 
mitigate the risk of a data breach. The recommendation is usually in the form of a patch or a recommended 
configuration setting. From gathering the information from the Next Generation Vulnerability Management (NGVM) 
software, an extensive list of vulnerabilities was generated. In an ideal environment, all those vulnerabilities would be 
addressed, but because resources are limited, there are only so many actions that can be resolved. As such, it is 
important to prioritize the resolution of these vulnerabilities. Utilizing the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), 
NIST has provided a severity level for each vulnerability. The scale uses “Low”, “Medium”, and “High” risk ratings, 
based off of the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), which utilizes the vulnerability characteristics to 
determine how likely an attack would utilize that vulnerability as well as how devastating the potential damage would 
result in order to generate the risk rating. A vulnerability analysis was then conducted to determine the extent of the 
threat that these vulnerabilities posed based on the computers’ configuration settings and network connections.  
Taking the vulnerabilities generated by the NGVM software as well as the results of the vulnerability analysis, a 
recommendation was compiled to provide to system administrators who could apply necessary changes to ensure the 
risks were mitigated. However there are instances where certain vulnerabilities could not be mitigated because of a 
requirement for certain versions of software or configuration settings for the set to operate as desired. If this was the 
case, additional documentation is required to trace the accepted risks.  
Reports were generated and presented to the SCCS IT Security group regarding the overall status of the sets. 
Issues such as certain machines being unavailable for scans or intriguing vulnerabilities were brought up so that key 
personnel within the IT Security group were made aware of the current situation. 
B. Automating the Accountability and Reporting Processes of Vulnerability Management 
The current process for discovering, analyzing and mitigating new vulnerabilities in the system begins with sifting 
through generated reports from vulnerability scanners. Through these reports, security analysts determine whether or 
not certain vulnerabilities do exist within the system or if they are false positives. However, the reports generated are 
lengthy and time consuming to process. One of the ways to expedite the accountability and reporting process of newly 
found vulnerabilities is to automate the prioritization of vulnerabilities to address. Using Visual Basic, scripts were 
developed to facilitate automating data processing. New fields were inserted to determine whether certain machines 
belonged to the operational set or the development set. Because the development set operates on a quicker patch cycle 
than the operational set, this results in the need for the development set to be prioritized when addressing 
vulnerabilities. A “critical patch” field was also created to provide the user with the flexibility and convenience of 
entering in a list of CVE IDs and to identify certain vulnerabilities with the specific CVE ID. The user could then filter 
the vulnerability report to display only pertinent or desired information. Finally the last feature added to the automation 
script was to determine the top ten vulnerabilities in the operational as well as the development set.  
The script then generates interactive charts for this data to give the user a visual representation of the information 
generated. This also allows the user to eliminate or include variables that may be pertinent to a specific query. These 
charts are then used in vulnerability management meetings for discussion. 
C. Non-Secure Configuration Management of Firewalls 
Another aspect of my project was to determine whether the firewalls protecting the SCCS network were properly 
configured per the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) recommendations. Using NGVM 
software, non-compliances with the USGCB recommendations were generated. Taking the trifecta of confidentiality, 
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integrity and availability, a prioritization order was determined to ensure the high risk non-compliances were 
addressed first. A collaboration was then formed with network engineers to determine which secure configurations to 
implement based on protocols and services needed by developers. These controls were then implemented on a test bed 
firewall to ensure that the implementation of these secure configurations would not interfere with necessary services. 
Following a successful implementation of the secure configurations on the test bed firewall, documentation was 
written and provided to network engineers to implement. 
D. Developing Scripts for Interfacing with NGVM Software 
The NGVM software uses a custom language to discover vulnerabilities or non-compliances with the security 
policies for the specific system. The software also allows security engineers to upload custom scripts to detect and 
determine user defined conditions. My task was to develop a script to detect the specific version of the operating 
system for reporting. This required an understanding of the process how computers are updated as well as how the 
NGVM software operates.  
E. Establishing a Cyber Security Lab 
The establishment of a cyber security lab for the SCCS project provides several benefits for security analysts 
within the project. This cyber-security lab will provide a resource for other analysts to learn about the tools that exist 
and how certain configurations affect an attacker’s ability to compromise a system. The lab consists of two servers 
with multiple virtual machines connected on a virtual network, which is separated from the KSC networks. This 
ensures that usage of the lab will not interfere with the daily operations or introduce external risks to the project. 
Establishing a Kali Linux distribution on a virtual machine as the attacker, we can launch exploits and attacks on 
virtual machines with varying operating systems. Future goals include expanding the server into additional computers, 
operating systems, firewalls and network switches. 
IV. Conclusions 
My role within the organization was to provide support for the IT Security group at the Kennedy Space Center 
within the Spaceport Command and Control Systems project. Most notably during this internship, I have researched 
vulnerabilities and their effect on mission critical assets, utilized Next Generation Vulnerability Management 
software to provide metadata to assist security analysts in understanding patterns within the vulnerabilities, and led 
an effort to tighten configurations into a more secure state for crucial firewalls. From supporting the vulnerability 
management cycle to developing a cyber security lab, I have had an amazing experience at the Kennedy Space 
Center and I hope to be working with this group again in the future.  
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